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NOTES
Government Contracts: Third Party Beneficiaries
and the Expanding Body of Federal Common Law
In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court was called
upon to decide whether state law or federal common law should
be used to determine the rights of third party beneficiaries of a
government contract. The author analyzes the competing policies
and suggests that since the rights or duties of the United States
were not at issue the Court correctly applied state law.
Shortly after takeoff from the DeKalb County Airport on the
morning of February 26, 1973, a Lear Jet crashed, killing the seven
persons aboard and severely injuring another on the ground. The
plane was destroyed and property at the crash site was extensively
damaged. The accident was caused by the ingestion of a large num-
ber of birds by the aircraft's engines.
In 1962, pursuant to the Federal Airport Act,' the Federal Avia-
tion Administration and DeKalb County, Georgia, had entered into
several Federal Grant Agreements whereby in exchange for federal
funds, the county had agreed, inter alia, to "operate and maintain
in a safe and serviceable condition the Airport and all facilities
thereon ... ."I Nevertheless, a county dump adjacent to the air-
port had been permitted to continue in existence attracting large
numbers of birds which posed a hazard for aircraft. As early as
March, 1970, the FAA had expressed its concern about the problem
to county officials.' In February of 1971, the county had assured the
FAA that the dump would be closed by August, 1972,1 but the
closing had never been effected. Following the crash of February 26,
1973, several actions were brought on various legal theories.' Most
significant was the claim based on the allegation that plaintiffs6
1. Federal Airport Act, ch. 251, § 11, 60 Stat. 176 (1946) (repealed 1970). These provi-
sions are now substantively contained in 49 U.S.C. § 1718 (1970), as amended by 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 1718 (Supp. Dec. 1976).
2. Miree v. United States, 526 F.2d 679, 687 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976).
3. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., at 17, Miree v. United States,
538 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1976).
4. Id.
5. E.g., negligence, nuisance, and breach of contract.
6. Miree sued as survivor to his parents; Phillips sued as survivor to her husband; Fields,
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were third party beneficiaries of the contract between the FAA and
DeKalb County. The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia dismissed the complaint finding that under
Georgia law DeKalb County was immune from suit. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
an action did lie under Georgia law.' On rehearing en banc, the court
reversed itself, adopting Judge Dyer's dissent from the first hearing
and holding that federal common law defines the rights of the third
party beneficiaries of a government contract."' On writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held reversed: the rights of the
third party beneficiaries of a government contract are determined
by state law when the obligations of the United States are not in
issue. Miree v. DeKalb County, 97 S. Ct. 2490 (1977).
The disillusionment of federal courts with the "attractive vision
of a uniform body of federal law"' began with Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.' The Erie Doctrine has been characterized as being con-
cerned with three kinds of situations."' The first situation is where
a federal statute is applicable to the facts of a particular case. If the
federal statute is constitutional, the supremacy clause requires that
the statute be followed in resolving the substantive issues pre-
sented." The second situation is where a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure is applicable. If the rule is procedural and does not enlarge,
abridge, or modify substantive state rights, the Rules Enabling Act
dictates that the federal rule be followed.' The third situation is
the person injured on the ground, sued for the burns he received; Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company, assignee of. the claim of Southeast Machinery, Inc., sued to recover for the de-
stroyed plane; Chassion sued to recover for damage to his property at the crash site. Miree
v. United States, 526-F.2d 679, 681 nn. 1-4, (5th Cir.1976).
7. Miree v. United States, 526 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976).
7.1. Miree v. United States, 538 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1976).
8. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103 (1945).
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. For a discussion of this approach to the Erie Doctrine, see Ely, The Irrespressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). The section provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure
of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions,
including admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice
and procedure in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions
of the Tax Court of the United States and for the judicial review or enforcement
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where there is no federal statute and no federal rule applicable.
Here, the Rules of Decision Act'3 requires that state law be fol-
lowed."
It is the third situation with which the Erie decision was pri-
marily concerned.'" But Erie went beyond the Rules of Decision Act
and held that where jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizen-
ship, the Constitution required the application of state substantive
law, whether statutory or judicial, as the rules of decision in federal
courts.'"
The effect of Erie was that federal courts sacrified "horizontal
uniformity" or interstate consistency, in order to achieve "vertical
uniformity" or intrastate consistency of decisions.' 7 This effect was
in accord with the Erie policy of "discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws."'" If the choice of forum could dictate the disposition of the
case, noncitizens, able to proceed in either federal or state court, 9
would be afforded an entirely fortuitous advantage. Erie was de-
signed to prevent this type of forum-shopping and the resultant
discrimination against citizens of the forum state.'"
of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970). "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply."
14. For a discussion of the Rules of Decision Act, see Ely, supra note 10, at 707-18.
15. It is this third situation that involves Miree. Clearly, no federal rule applies, and if
a federal statute were applicable, the court of appeals would not have used federal common
law.
16. 304 U.S. at 78.
17. In Miree both the Supreme Court and the court of appeals were concerned primarily
with "horizontal uniformity" or interstate consistency of decision. For a discussion of the
"vertical uniformity" that troubled the Erie Court, see McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie
Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884, 888-901 (1965).
18. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
19. Unlike the citizens of the forum state, noncitizens can sue citizen's in federal court
by invoking diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
20. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 74-75. The court objected to the prior rule of Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S.- (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), because it "introduced grave discrimination by non-
citizens against citizens. It made rights . . . vary according to whether enforcement was
sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting the court . . . was
conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of
the law." Id.
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. Nevertheless, federal courts have since found numerous reasons
for applying federal common law instead of state law in certain
instances.' In the noted case, the court of appeals had applied
federal common law" because the case involved a government con-
tract entered pursuant to authority conferred by federal statute 3
and therefore might affect the rights and obligations of the United
States. 4
21. As Judge Morgan pointed out in his dissent to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Miree,
the Court applied federal common law to decide '"whether the water of an interstate stream
must be apportioned' on the same day it decided Erie. 538 F.2d 643, 645 n.4, quoting
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). Interest-
ingly, Justice Brandeis wrote both the Erie and Hinderlider opinions.
22. Judge Dyer, in a footnote to his dissent to the panel opinion, 526 F.2d at 686 n.1,
which was later adopted as the opinion of the court by the en banc majority, argued that
recovery should be denied even if state law were applied. The dissenters to the en banc
opinion argued that recovery should be permitted under both federal and state law. The
Supreme Court refused to find that Judge Dyer's footnote expressed the opinion of the
majority and remanded to let the court of appeals consider the claim under Georgia law. 97
S. Ct. at 2495. For the purposes of this note, it will be presumed that the plaintiffs can recover
only if state law is applied.
23. The Supreme Court has acknowledged "that neither Coigress nor the federal courts
can . . . fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in
Article I or some other section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern
because there can be no other law." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965). In Miree
the court of appeals emphasized that the contract was entered into "pursuant to authority
conferred by federal statute," 526 F.2d at 686, suggesting by implication that the application
of state law would affect the government's power to contract. Thus the court held that "[t]he
necessity of uniformity of decision demands that federal common law . . . control the con-
tract's interpretation." Id.
In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), the Court noted that
"[wihen the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitu-
tional function or power." Id. at 366. To subject that power to the "vagaries of the laws of
the several states," allows the states to regulate the extent of that power. Id. at 367. Where
the rights and duties of the government under a contract are unaffected by state rules, the
fears expressed by Clearfield evaporate.
The Court in United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944), noted that
"[elvery acquisition, holding, or disposition of property by the Federal Government depends
upon proper exercise of a constitutional grant of power . . . . Procurement policies so settled
under federal authority may not be defeated or limited by state law." Id. at 182. To allow
state laws to regulate the procurement policies of the government restricts the constitutional
grant of power to the United States. In Miree, however, application of state law in no way
inhibits the exercise of the government's power. The United States is free to enter contracts,
and federal law still controls the obligations owed to and expected of the government. But
the substantive issue in Miree was not the interpretation of the obligations owed to or ex-
pected of the government; it was whether the county's failure to fulfill its obligations creates
a cause of action in a third party. The constitution does not require that such determination
be made by reference to federal law instead of state law.
When the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, it did so because "[t]he litiga-
tion raise[d] no question regarding the liability of the United States or the responsibilities
of the United States under the contract." 97 S. Ct. at 2493.
24. In concurring with the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision, Judge Tjoflat suggested that
[Vol. 31:1493
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The argument for the application of federal common law is
based primarily on the 1943 decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.5 There the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he rights and duties of the United States on
commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal rather
than local law.""6 In that case the endorsement of a check drawn on
the Treasurer of the United States was forged. The check was pre-
"government contracts, and especially those having to do with the airways, should be con-
trolled by federal law.." 538 F.2d at 644-45. It is important to recognize that federal law should
not govern this action simply because the action relates to regulation of the airways. The
Supreme Court pointed out that "the fact that the United States has a substantial interest
in regulating aircraft travel and promoting air travel safety [is not] sufficient, given the
narrow question before us, to call into play the rule of Clearfield Trust." 97 S. Ct. at 2495.
While Judge Tjoflat didn't argue specifically that this kind of federal interest required the
application of federal common law, some of the authorities he used for support are often cited
for that very principle. It therefore is appropriate to explore briefly the relevance of the cases
to which he referred.
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972), the Court wrote that "[wihen
we deal with air or water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common
law .... ." In Miree, however, the facts raise no issue dealing with air in its interestate
aspect. The facts concern a Lear Jet that never left the state of Georgia. Were it not for the
presence of a government contract, most courts would follow state law. E.g., Uppgren v.
Executive Aviation Serv., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1971); Quandt v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1970); Pierce v. Wienerschnitzel Int'l, Inc., 313 F. Supp.
740 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Maryland v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 514 P.2d 314 (1973); Williams v. Petroleum Heli-
copters, Inc., 234 So. 2d 522 (La. 1970); Moats v. Metropolitan Bank, 40 Ohio St. 2d 47, 319
N.E.2d 603 (1974); Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 634 (Okla. 1974); Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422
Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897 (1966); Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972); Gridley
v. Cardenas, 3 Wis. 2d 623, 89 N.W.2d 286 (1958).
In Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S.
978 (1975), the court of appeals ruled that Congress had preempted state regulation of avia-
tion. There, a large jet had collided in mid-air with a smaller aircraft. The owner of the jet
and the United States were sued, and they in turn sued the owner of the small plane for
contribution and indemnity. The court ruled that Congress had preempted state regulation
of aviation and therefore federal law controlled. The court could easily have applied federal
law under Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), since the rights and
duties of the United States were at issue. Instead, the court referred to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-04, 1321-25, 1341-55, 1371-87, 1401-06, 1421-32, 1441-43, 1461-
63, 1471-74, 1481-89, 1501-12, 1521-23, 1531-42 (1970), to show that "Congress expressed the
view that the control of aviation should rest exclusively in the hands of the federal govern-
ment." 504 F.2d at 404. But the section cited by the court, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §
1108(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1970), only refers to exclusive dominance in the airspace of the
United States. The wording applies to the facts of Kohr, but not to the facts here. As such,
it may be argued that Kohr does not control the disposition of Miree.
25. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
26. Id. at 366.
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sented to a store owned by the J.C. Penney Company, and endorsed
by that party over to the Clearfield Trust Company. The Clearfield
Trust Company collected payment from the United States, and
guaranteed prior endorsements. Three years later, the United States
sued for its money. Pennsylvania law prohibited recovery because
"the United States unreasonably delayed in giving notice of the
forgery."27 The Supreme Court ignored state law because
Itihe application of state law, even without the conflict of laws
rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the
United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to
the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability of
a uniform rule is plain."'
Courts have subsequently applied the Clearfield rule to a variety of
situations." Where the rights and duties of the United States are at
issue, very few courts have ever applied state law.3
In the instant case, however, the rights and duties of the United
States are not at issue." The federal government is not being sued
27. Id.
28. Id. at 367.
29. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970) (the Government's right to be indem-
nified by a contractor when an employee of the contractor sues for injuries under the Federal
Tort Claims Act is governed by federal law); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301 (1947) (the Government's right to be indemnified by an oil company when one of its trucks
injures a soldier who sues under the Federal Tort Claims Act is governed by federal law);
National Metro. Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945) (the Government's right to be
reimbursed by banks collecting on United States checks which were forged is governed by
federal law); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) (a county's right to tax
property owned by the United States but used by a manufacturer pursuant to a government
contract is controlled by federal law).
30. But see United States v. John Kerns Constr. Co., 140 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1944);
Alameda County v. United States, 124 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1941); United States v. Brookridge
Farm, 1ll F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1940); Rhode Island Discount Co. v. United States, 94 F. Supp.
669 (Ct. CI. 1951).
31. Judge Dyer, whose dissent to the Fifth Circuit's panel decision was later adopted by
the en banc majority, suggested that the obligations of the United States were being litigated.
He argued that if the plaintiffs were third party beneficiaries with respect to one party to
the contract, then they also must be third party beneficiaries with respect to the other party.
526 F.2d at 686 n.2. But the county was the promisor and had the obligation to make the
airport safe for the plaintiffs' benefit. The United States was the promisee and cannot be sued
for the county's breach. CALAMARI & PERILo, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 252 (1970). The
Government promised to provide funds, and it did. It did not promise to cut off funds; the
county's breach would merely relieve the United States of a duty to provide funds, not create
a duty to cut off funds.
It is clear that the United States did not believe its rights were being litigated. The
[Vol. 31:1493
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on the breach of contract theory. DeKalb County is the party ac-
cused of breaching a contractual duty to the plaintiffs. If the plain-
tiffs win, the county, and not the United States, will be liable for
damages. :"
In the noted case, the Supreme Court relied on two of its earlier
decisions to support its finding that state law should control. In
Bank of America National Trust & Savingg Asqociation v. Parnell,
33
the plaintiff bank alleged that the defendants had "converted 73
Home Owners' Loan Corporation bonds which belonged to
[plaintiff].""4 Payment on the bonds was guaranteed by the United
States. The determination of which party had the burden of proof
to show notice and lack of good faith was held to be a question
governed by state law on grounds that the litigation was between
private parties and did not touch the rights or duties of the United
States. The Court compared the Parnell situation with Miree:
The parallel between Parnell and this case is obvious. The ques-
tion of whether petitioners may sue respondent does not require
decision under federal common law since the litigation is among
private parties and no substantial rights or duties of the United
States hinge on its outcome. On the other hand, nothing we say
here forecloses the applicability of federal common law in inter-
preting the rights and duties of the United States under federal
contracts."
It should be noted that the Parnell Court pointed out that if
interpretation of the rights and obligations created by the bonds
themselves had been at issue, federal law would have controlled.36
In Miree, the third party beneficiary claims do require an interpre-
tation of the rights and duties created by the contract, Therefore,
Solicitor General, waiving his right to respond, advised the Supreme Court:
In the course of the proceedings below, the United States determined that its
interests would not be directly affected by the resolution of these issue (sic) and
therefore did not participate in briefing or argument in the Court of Appeals. In
view of these considerations, the United States does not intend to respond to the
petitions unless it is requested to do so by the court.
97 S. Ct. at 2494.
32. Actually, as Judge Morgan points out in his dissent, the interests of the United
States are better served if the county loses. Such a result would encourage the county to keep
its promise to operate the airport in a safe and serviceable condition. 538 F.2d at 646 n.5.
33. 352 U.S. 29 (1956); for further discussion, see 45 CALIF. L. REv. 212 (1957).
34. 352 U.S. at 30.
35. 97 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
36. 352 U.S. at 34.
19771
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it might be argued that the Parnell rationale calls for application
of federal law in Miree. However, in this context, a distinction must
be made between bonds and contracts even though both are instru-
ments of the United States. When a court determines the rights
created by bonds, it is determining whom the United States is re-
quired to pay on those bonds. When it determines the rights created
by a contract, as in Miree, it may have no effect at all on the
obligations or duties of the United States. Therefore, it is submitted
that the reasoning in Parnell is not inconsistent with the Court's
conclusion that state law should govern in Miree.
The Supreme Court also relied on Wallis v. Pan American Pe-
troleum Corp.7 There, the defendant applied for a lease of federal
lands under the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands." There-
after, he entered a written agreement with one plaintiff whereby he
surrendered a one-third interest in any lease granted under that
application. He also sold the other plaintiff an option to acquire his
remaining rights in any lease obtained under that application. Two
years later, the defendant applied for land under the Mineral Leas-
ing Act of 1920,38 which governed Public Domain Land. He was
subsequently granted a lease on the basis of this application. Both
plaintiffs then sued for their interests on oral representations that
their written agreement would also apply to the second application.
Louisiana law excluded the oral representations by requiring a writ-
ten agreement. Because the Supreme Court failed to find a
"significant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest," 0
state law was applied. There, too, the rights and obligations of the
United States would be unaffected regardless of the outcome of the
litigation.
The court of appeals had tried to put Miree within the
Clearfield rule by pointing to the presence of a government contract,
and in fact the Clearfield rule has been extended to many cases
involving government contracts.4 Where the United States is a
37. 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
38. 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1964).
39. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1964).
40. 384 U.S. at 68.
41. For a discussion of the choice of law question in government contract cases, see Gaede
& Bynum, Federal Procurement Contracts-Dispute Resolution and the Developing Federal
Common Law, 27 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1975); Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in
Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 LA. L. REV. 37 (1951). Note that Miree does not
[Vol. 31:1493
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plaintiff in an action under a contract involving the disposition of
government property, federal law defines the rights of the parties.2
The same is true where the United States is the defendant.43 Even
if government property is not involved, where the United States is
a party to an action and its rights and obligations are involved,"
federal law is almost always applied."5
In situations where the United States is not a party to the
action, however, and its rights are not being litigated, the Supreme
Court has looked to see if there is a conflict between an identifiable
federal interest or policy, and the use of state law.46 This identifiable
federal interest could be national security,47 the judge-jury relation-
ship in the federal courts,4" or a valid interest in having uniform
results. 9 In Miree the government was not a party to the action,50
its rights were not at issue, and there was no readily ascertainable
federal interest.' Under these kinds of circumstances, the Supreme
involve a government contract which is controlled by federal law simply because a federal
statute so requires. See, e.g., FDIC v. Rectenwall, 97 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ind. 1951), where
the court applied federal law because FDIC contracts are controlled by federal law under 12
U.S.C. 264(j) (1970). In that kind of situation, if the statute is constitutional, it controls the
choice of law used.
42. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); United States v. McCabe
Co., 261 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Jones, 175 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1949).
43. United States v. Rice, 137 U.S. 61 (1942); Seabrook Farms Co. v. Commodity Credit
Corp., 206 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1953); Penn-Ohio Steel Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 254 (Ct.
Cl. 1965); Boy v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 67 (M.D.N.C. 1959).
44. See generally Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
991, 997-1001 (1953).
45. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Lynn, 503
F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1974); Smith v. United States, 497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1974); First Nat'l
Bank v. SBA, 429 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Le Roy Dyal Co., Inc., 186 F.2d
460 (3d Cir. 1950); Cate v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ala. 1966); Keydata Corp.
v. United States, 504 F.2d 1115 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. United States,
172 F. Supp. 268 (Ct. Cl. 1959). But 5ee cases cited note 31 supra.
46. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 394 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
47. American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640 (9th Cir.
1961). For further discussion, see Note, 26 ALBANY L. REV. ll (1962); 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1519
(1961); 60 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1961).
48. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
49. Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
978 (1975).
50. The United States is not being sued on the breach of contract theory. If it were, the
action would have to be in the court of claims since the district courts only have jurisdiction
over contract actions against the United States when the amount in controversy is less than
$10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970): 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
51. See note 40 supra, and accompanying text.
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Court has applied state law to determine the rights of the parties.2
Nevertheless, the court of appeals in Miree ruled that the ac-
tion should be governed by federal common law. Judge Dyer, whose
earlier dissenting opinion was adopted by the court en banc, relied
on several cases for support, 3 including United States v.
Seckinger.54 In that case the United States had entered an agree-
ment hiring a contractor for plumbing work on a marine base in
South Carolina. One of the contractor's employees was injured, and
recovered under South Carolina's workmen's compensation law. He
also recovered against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.5 The Government then sued the contractor for reim-
bursement, claiming that his negligence had caused the injury. The
contractor's obligation under the contract was "to perform the work
properly and safely and to provide workmanlike service in the per-
formance of said work.""6 The Supreme Court relied on United
States v. Allegheny County57 and Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States" in deciding that federal common law governed the interpre-
tation of that clause in the contract.
59
Seckinger is immediately distinguishable from Miree both be-
cause the United States was a party to the action and because its
rights and duties were at issue. The other cases relied upon by the
Supreme Court are distinguishable for the same reasons."
Since the facts of Miree present no "significant threat to any
identifiable federal policy or interest,"'" and the "resolution of
[the] breach of contract claim . . .will have no direct effect upon
the United States or its Treasury,"".' there is no reason to apply
52. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966); Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1952).
53. Smith v. United States, 497 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1974); First Nat'l Bank v. SBA, 429
F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1970). In each case the United States was a party and its rights were being
litigated. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text, supra.
54. 397 U.S. 203 (1970).
55. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970).
56. 397 U.S. at 206.
57. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
58. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
59. 397 U.S. at 209.
60. In both United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944), and Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), the federal government was a party whose rights
were being litigated.
61. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966).
61.1. 97 S. Ct. at 2494.
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federal common law. The Supreme Court therefore correctly re-
versed the court of appeals.
Application of state law, however, has traditionally been justi-
fied with reference to the "twin aims" of the Erie decision-
discouraging forum shopping and inequitable administration of
the laws.6" Since application of state law in Miree is presumably
more favorable to the plaintiffs in that the majority decided there
could be no recovery under federal law, 3 the "twin aims" considera-
tions are not present. There would be no occasion for forum shop-
ping by the plaintiffs because they would wish to invoke state law;
there could be no discrimination since either citizens or noncitizens
could bring the action in state court. Underlying the Erie decision,
however, is the federalist notion that certain rights are "reserved by
the Constitution to the several states." 4 This constitutional basis
of Erie would require application of state law despite the absence
of "twin aims" considerations. Where, as in Miree there is no identi-
fiable federal interest, it is submitted that Erie and the constitution
require that state law be applied. Congress has no power, whether
by statute, contract, or any other means, "to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a state . . . And no clause in
the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts."" Determining whether third party beneficiaries have a
cause of action against a county in Georgia "substantially affects
those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our con-
stitutional system leaves to state regulation."66 Congress has not,
and constitutionally could not, regulate this determination. The
federal courts, under the guise of interpreting a government con-
tract, should not be given the kind of general lawmaking power
implicit in the application of federal common law to these facts. In
unanimously reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the principles underlying the Erie decision, and limited
the expanding body of federal common law.
GERALD J. HAYES
62. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 468; see notes 17-20 supra, and accompanying text.
63. See note 22 supra.
64. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. at 80.
65. 304 U.S. at 78.
66. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring), citing H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 678 (1953).
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